It's easy enough to criticize the diversion of $230 million earmarked for Pakistani counter-terrorism efforts to the upgrade of Pakistan's F-16 force, but I'm not sure that it really leads anywhere. To be sure, the F-16s will be of minimal use in a counter-insurgency role (although it's fair to say that improved targeting systems are a good thing for this kind of warfare), but Pakistan has been extremely reluctant to use the money we've sent since 9/11 for anything of actual value to the fight against insurgents.
The problem, in the end, is political; the Pakistani state has good political reasons for not trying to exercise control over portions of its territory, and giving it money and telling it to fight insurgents isn't going to resolve that issue. This is true no matter who runs Islamabad. At the same time, we need Pakistani cooperation for a number of other reasons, so we can't just cut them off. Indeed, the closer we grow to India the more we're going to have to reassure Pakistan that we're not taking sides against it. This is, by nature, a frustrating, unsatisfactory, and complicated relationship.
--Robert Farley
