Egypt's decision to amend its current constitution through referendum will have a great impact on shaping its transition to democracy. Many of the more liberal and secular forces opposed the amendments in part because they will lead to elections sooner rather than later, lending a distinct advantage to established groups like deposed dictator Hosni Mubarak's National Democratic Party and the Muslim Brotherhood. Issandr el Amrani argues the referendum exposed political and cultural divides in Egyptian society but that there were important structural forces driving the vote:
The question of security and the public's desire for normality after the 18 days of unrest that brought down former president Hosni Mubarak's regime was a much more relevant factor in the referendum's outcome. The old regime, for all its many ills, got citizens accustomed to a stability that was remarkable by Middle Eastern standards. Nearby Palestine, Lebanon or Iraq were often used as cautionary examples of dire alternatives by regime officials. But the fear of instability is not simply based on prospects for violence or state collapse. It has a direct economic underpinning. Experts say that over 50 per cent of Egypt's economy is informal and that a large proportion of the population depends on day-to-day wages. Unlike civil servants and salaried private sector workers, informal workers don't get paid during national unrest. Their income has dropped dramatically due to disruptions to the economy caused by strikes. When 40 per cent of the population hover on the poverty line and have little or no savings, not being able to work can mean not being able to feed your own family.
The referendum also showed a yawning social divide. This went beyond expectations that wealthy neighbourhoods where the educated middle and upper class turned out the most "no" votes during the poll, with central Cairo leading the dissent. This trend garnered the most focus among despondent elite liberal secularists, who are acutely aware of their inability to connect with a wider Egyptian public.
Some things are universal. Even in Egypt, it's still the economy, stupid.
El Amrani argues that the middle-class activists who drove the public uprising in Egypt have to figure out a way to appeal to the Egyptian masses, who have long been courted by the Muslim Brotherhood. The biggest threat to Egypt's democratic aspirations, however, isn't an Islamist takeover of the country but rather a transition to an illiberal democracy.
