Something is fishy about this article on the U.S. relationship with Afghan President Hamid Karzai. Apparently, the White House is hitting the ol' reset button beginning at a recent meeting with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton : But instead of revisiting old disputes, Karzai brought in several cabinet ministers to talk about development and security. He explained details of a new effort to address graft. And halfway through a meal of lamb stew, chicken and rice, he looked across the table and said he had decided that the United States would be a "critical partner" in his second term, according to a senior U.S. official familiar with the meeting.I'm glad he's decided that the U.S. is a "critical partner," but that's not exactly his decision, is it, given the whole U.S.-military-keeps-him-in-power thing? While Rajiv Chandrasekaran's piece suggests that Karzai's efforts are a result of "top diplomats and generals ... abandoning for now their get-tough tactics with Karzai and attempting to forge a far warmer relationship," I just don't think the chronology adds up. It was only a week ago that Ambassador Karl Eikenberry was arguing that the U.S. shouldn't send more troops specifically to have more leverage over Karzai, leading the president to reject all of his staff's proposals. I doubt that things have since turned around dramatically since then.Reading on, the change in dynamic seems to be this: The new approach "will entail more engagement with members of Karzai's cabinet and provincial governors, officials said, because they have concluded that the Afghan president lacks the political clout in his highly decentralized nation to purge corrupt local warlords and power brokers." Essentially, U.S. officials have realized Karzai is inept and are bypassing him, which is much better explanation of why he's suddenly decided the U.S. ought to be his critical partner.That's not to say there is no merit in Chrasekaran's analysis, which does show that the U.S. has pushed Karzai pretty hard throughout the election cycle, and made some diplomatic missteps that led Karzai to seek unsavory allies. But the article concludes with a quote from a senior official saying that Karzai isn't obstructionist, just inept, and with mention that at Clinton's feel-good meeting, she also delivered the news that further U.S. aid would be contingent on the Afghan government hitting certain benchmarks, not exactly a message Karzai wants to hear. Maybe the U.S. is taking a warmer tone with Karzai, but that's because they've realized how ineffectual he is, which in turn has led him to emphasize his value to the American project. The combination of the U.S. dealing with the facts on the ground and Karzai being cooperative might be a very good outcome indeed.
-- Tim Fernholz
