Michael Cohen is right to say that the NIE on Iran heralds a return of deterrence theory to American foreign policy. But in some ways, the more important takeaway from the passages Cohen quotes pertain to rational choice theory. Put simply: The Iranian regime was rational. It wasn't some eschatological head trip seeking the biggest weapon possible to speed the return of the 12th Imam. Instead, "Iran halted the [nuclear weapons] program in 2003 primarily in response to international pressure indicat[ing] Tehran’s decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs." The imputation of crazy was not only key to the case against Iran -- you don't want crazies controlling atomic weapons, after all -- but crucial to how we were supposed to respond to Iran. The government's religious fanaticism, we were told, made them impervious to traditional incentives-based approaches, and thus rendered regime change the only viable option. If we assumed a rational Iran -- one, for instance, that wouldn't want to be obliterated by Israel's submarine mounted, second strike capacities -- it wouldn't have made any sense to treat their pursuit of weaponry as an existential threat rather a play for power and prestige. That's why an irrational Iran was so important. If you wanted to invade, you needed to make them crazy. So Frontpage was writing things like,"it is the apocalyptic element to Ahmadinejad’s faith combined with Iran’s nuclear ambitions that should draw the most serious attention. He believes that a great cataclysm of bloodshed anticipates the return of the 12th Imam, in particular the destruction of infidels – Jews and Christians – that will usher in a new dawn of Islamic worldwide dominance." The Telegraph helpfully informed us that "[Ahmedinejad] actively seeks to bring about an apocalyptic struggle between the righteous and the wicked to accelerate the return of the mahdi or Hidden Imam." Daniel Pipes spoke of his "mystical menace."
