If you want a model for how to think about the political wrangling over the bailout bill, you could do worse than the collapse of the comprehensive immigration reform bill that almost passed in 2006. There, you had strong elite consensus. You had White House support and urgency. You had buy-in from not only congressional leadership, but powerful congressional players (in that case, Kennedy and McCain; in this case, Dodd and Bennett). A deal seemed absolutely imminent. Observers thought that there was left to do was wrangle over some technical points. You also had a controversial issue where both sides needed cover to vote for the final bill. And it turned out there was broad opposition laying dormant in the electorate and House Republicans, using talk radio and e-mails and letters and phone calls, harness it for an overwhelming and ferocious show of opposition. Somewhat symbiotically, as they did more to stop the bill and erode impressions of its inevitability, the grassroots became more activated and outspoken, further steeling the spine of congressional Republicans and bringing new converts (who eventually included John McCain) over to their side of the issue. The cover evaporated, and the bill died. No one figured out a way to break that gridlock. In Congress, if you dont have the votes, you don't ave the votes. Moreover, my hunch is Republicans think their opposition to the immigration bill worked rather well for them, and would have little compunction about repeating the model, particularly in a moment when they're desperate for something, anything, to run on in 2008. The wild cards here are McCain -- though it's unclear how much leverage he really has -- and the credit markets. If the deal falling through sends the stock market into free fall or creates a rapid credit contraction, opposition to a bailout won't be tenable. But there's real precedent for this bill to die. Weve seen this film before.
