The great strength of the analytic section of the report is the emphasis it places on the need for "national reconciliation" in Iraq, a political accommodation that leaders of major Iraqi institutions and the bulk of Iraqi public opinion regards as preferable to war. In principle, such a reconciliation should be possible. The ongoing warfare in Iraq has, obviously, been devastating to the Iraqi people and looks likely to become more devastating in the future. Under the circumstances, one would hope that people could find a settlement that all sides would find preferable to the continuation of fighting. Unfortunately, however, the world is filled with situations where lack of trust and a legacy of fear and bitterness keep people trapped in negative-sum conflicts. Iraq, by all indications, is just such a case. As the ISG report notes, essentially none of the influential actors in Iraq appear seriously interested in an agenda of national reconciliation. In particular:
- Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki "has publicly rejected a U.S. timetable to achieve certain benchmarks, ordered the removal of blockades around Sadr City, sought more control over Iraqi security forces, and resisted U.S. requests to move forward on reconciliation or on disbanding Shiite militias."
- Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, by contrast, "has encouraged a unified Shia bloc with moderated aims within a unified Iraq" but his "influence may be waning, as his words have not succeeded in preventing intra-Shia violence or retaliation against Sunnis."
- Abdul Aziz al-Hakim's SCIRI is "the largest and most organized Shia political party" and it "seeks the creation of an autonomous Shia region comprising nine provinces in the south."
- Sunni Arabs, meanwhile "reject a federal, decentralized Iraq and do not see a Sunni autonomous region as feasible for themselves."
- Tariq al-Hashimi of the Iraqi Islamic Party "opposes the formation of autonomous regions" and demands "a reversal of de-Baathification, and the removal of Shiite militia fighters from the Iraqi security forces."
- Sheikh Harith al-Dari "is the head of the Muslim Scholars Association, the most influential Sunni organization in Iraq" -- and a "warrant was recently issued for his arrest for inciting violence and terrorism, an act that sparked bitter Sunni protests across Iraq."
- Muqtada al-Sadr is "building a political party that controls basic services within the government and an armed militia outside of the government."
In this bracing context, the ISG's substantive recommendations are simply bizarre. They propose embedding more American troops within Iraqi Army units. They want U.S. civilian agencies to do more in Iraq and help Iraqis, for example, to bolster their ability to conduct criminal investigations and put together "witness-protection facilities."
This idea captures the sheer perversity of the enterprise. Iraq is, obviously, just about the last place on earth the federal government should be committing resources to putting together a better witness-protection program. There are, no doubt, lots of countries who could use help in this regard. Mexico comes to mind. Or, for that matter, Baltimore. The salient fact about Iraq, however, is that the country is mired in an increasingly brutal civil war. Witness protection isn't going to help when the country's falling apart.
The reports recommendations are, almost universally, like this -- Band-Aids for a country in need of a heart transplant.
The exceptions, of course, come in the portion of the report concerned with bringing about national reconciliation. The ISG's plan for this has two parts. First is, laughably, to ask the Iraqis to reconcile. The second part, more laughably, is to ask other governments to ask the Iraqis to reconcile. One must have a low opinion of the Bush administration indeed to think that option one hasn't occurred to them. In fact, the administration -- most recently in the person of ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad -- has been trying just this. It hasn't worked. The problem, as could be seen with reference to the analytic section of the report, is that Iraqi leaders aren't buying what we're trying to sell them. Years of chaos, fighting, and foreign occupation have created a dynamic that asking nicely can't break.
At this point, there's simply nothing to be done about it and certainly nothing we can do about it. As Ivo Daalder points out, "the only reality that matters -- and one the ISG Report, for all its realism, refuses to accept -- is that we have lost in Iraq." Adding insult to injury, the ISG's refusal to engage with this central reality undermines its more worthwhile ideas. In particular, though "New Diplomatic Offensive" with capital letters is a silly thing to say, the sort of re-engagement with diplomacy that section calls for is much needed. But linking such a call for re-engagement to efforts to succeed in Iraq merely dooms re-engagement to fail.
Bad ideas for Iraq are nothing new, of course. What's especially egregious about the ISG's recommendations is that the commission clearly recognizes the nature of the problem, as evidenced by the opening section of its own report. It then fails to address its own analysis simply because the only reasonable conclusion to draw from it is the politically unacceptable one that we've lost and we need to leave. The result, simply put, is a gross abdication of responsibility.
