THE SURGE AND AL QAEDA. In an article lambasting the internal incoherency of Dick Lugar's middle way in Iraq, Rick Lowry says, "Would we be better off if we had taken Lugar’s advice and already short-circuited the surge? To ask the question is almost to answer it. The turn of the Sunni tribes against al-Qaeda — facilitated by our counterinsurgency operations — would be in jeopardy." This bit of surge-facilitated improvement is often mentioned, but rarely explored. What, exactly, does Lowry believe the surge did here? How did an increase in American troops turn Sunni tribes against al Qaeda? What was the causal mechanism by which the influx of US troops convinced Sunni tribes to shift their allegiances and put their own necks on the line? Answer: It didn't. The Sunni tribes were already turning on al Qaeda because al Qaeda was intruding on their territory and autonomy. Michael Gordon, reporting on a sheik from the Dulaimi tribe who's begun fighting on our side, writes, "Ali had a powerful motivation to work with the American troops. Al Qaeda militants had killed his father, kidnapped his cousin, burned his home to the ground and alienated many of his fellow tribesmen by imposing a draconian version of Islamic law that proscribed smoking and required women to shroud themselves in veils." Like much else in Iraq, this has nothing to do with us -- save that we brought al Qaeda to the country. Moreover, it does nothing to advance our interests. The tribes will take our arms, training, and money while they're fighting al Qaeda, and once that particular challenge to their supremacy is vanquished, they will turn those weapons and men on the next force that doesn't sufficiently respect their autonomy and interests. That force may be us, or it may be the Iraqi government, or it may be the Shi'ites. In any case, their turn against the terrorists who're killing their countrymen is not evidence that they will be allies in our vision for Iraq. Currently, an alliance with America is useful in pursuit of their interests, as we're offering them money and materials they find helpful. Later, it may not be. This is not progress, at least as commonly defined. And it is not the fault of the surge, but rather of al Qaeda. But that's the genius of the surge strategy: Anything that's good is redefined as Progress, and anything that's Progress is defined as a result of the surge. Meanwhile, anything that's bad -- like the continued killings and instability -- is explained as all the more reason to continue the surge. Heads we lose, tails Iraq loses. Also, heads Iraq loses. Update: For more on our dealings with the Sunni tribes, see Ilan Goldberg. --Ezra Klein
