To sharpen one of the arguments from my earlier post, when analyzing reduced violence in Iraq, you have to try and figure out the mechanisms, and whether they represent real changes in the underlying situation or ephemeral improvements that will worsen as soon as our deployment, or some other factor, changes. As I understand the situation, experts credit four main trends for the reduction in violence: Some of it was due to ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, which effectively ended conflict in the city by leaving Shias without Sunnis to kill. Some was the Anbar Awakening, where a set of Sunni tribes turned on al Qaeda offshoots that were threatening their autonomy. We armed these tribes, and their war was effective. Some was Sadr's decision to enhance his political legitimacy by directing his militias to temporarily stand down. Some was the addition of more troops dispersed through the actual communities. This made them more effective fighting units, and increased their ability to hunt insurgents. Some of these effects are temporary. Some aren't. It's a safe bet that Sunnis aren't moving back to Baghdad any time soon, so the violence in that city should remain low. The Sunni tribes that participated in the Anbar Awakening won't welcome a resurgent al Qaeda, but nor will they necessarily welcome a centralized Shia government attempting to assert control. And now they're heavily armed. It's possible a deal will be struck, and it's possible a civil war will break out. Sadr's troops will remain quiet unless Sadr decides he wants to wage a guerrilla war. And our troops will only be there so long. Our force density might have convinced some of the actors to lay low, but as the Other Klein argues, our forces won't be there forever: THE SURGE'S HELPERS.
To sharpen one of the arguments from my earlier post, when analyzing reduced violence in Iraq, you have to try and figure out the mechanisms, and whether they represent real changes in the underlying situation or ephemeral improvements that will worsen as soon as our deployment, or some other factor, changes. As I understand the situation, experts credit four main trends for the reduction in violence: Some of it was due to ethnic cleansing in Baghdad, which effectively ended conflict in the city by leaving Shias without Sunnis to kill. Some was the Anbar Awakening, where a set of Sunni tribes turned on al Qaeda offshoots that were threatening their autonomy. We armed these tribes, and their war was effective. Some was Sadr's decision to enhance his political legitimacy by directing his militias to temporarily stand down. Some was the addition of more troops dispersed through the actual communities. This made them more effective fighting units, and increased their ability to hunt insurgents. Some of these effects are temporary. Some aren't. It's a safe bet that Sunnis aren't moving back to Baghdad any time soon, so the violence in that city should remain low. The Sunni tribes that participated in the Anbar Awakening won't welcome a resurgent al Qaeda, but nor will they necessarily welcome a centralized Shia government attempting to assert control. And now they're heavily armed. It's possible a deal will be struck, and it's possible a civil war will break out. Sadr's troops will remain quiet unless Sadr decides he wants to wage a guerrilla war. And our troops will only be there so long. Our force density might have convinced some of the actors to lay low, but as the Other Klein argues, our forces won't be there forever: 
