Nate Silver's list of likely swing Senators is useful, but a bit too blunt. When trying to figure out whether a Senator will swing, you have to ask "on what?" Baucus might swing on taxes but not on abortion. McCain might swing on cap-and-trade but not on taxes. Lugar might cut deals on foreign policy but not on gay marriage. And so forth, and so on. "Swing" isn't actually a terribly useful descriptor. And if you're using the term in a more limited sense, to denote senators from states where they are vulnerable to political pressure, you have to figure out when their next election is. If Norm Coleman wins the recount, he's safe for six years. His actions in 2009 will have little bearing on his reelection in 2014. Blanche Lincoln, by contrast, is up for reelection in 2010, and her actions in 2009 will in part be a function of that upcoming challenge.Beyond individuals, though, you have to examine the environment. If Barack Obama is a popular president, than it would make little sense for Lincoln to swing against his priorities. If he's an unpopular president with a controversial agenda, the calculus reverses. So you have to distinguish senators who swing for their own reasons from senators who swing to secure reelection. Norm Coleman makes the occasional moderate vote because he doesn't want to lose his job, and so predicting his behavior requires assessing his electoral prospects. John McCain makes the occasional liberal vote because he wants to get on the teevee, so predicting his likely behavior requires assessing his personal interests. And then there's the question of party leadership. Sometimes a vulnerable senator might want to break with their president, but the leadership threatens consequences so severe that they swallow their terror and vote with their colleagues. But that requires strong and effective party leadership, and a belief that close association with the party will not be an electoral anchor. For the Republican Party, at this juncture, that calculus may or may not hold.All of this underscores what a complicated place the Senate is, and how important it is for a presidential administration to really understand the institution and its players. That's why I find the presence of Joe Biden, Rahm Emanuel, and Tom Daschle so reassuring. Before you can manipulate a senator's incentives, you have to understand, to a pretty high degree of abstraction, what those incentives are. The Clinton team, in 1993 and 1994, was clueless on this front. Obama's staff will not be.Image used under a CC license from .Bullish. SWINGERS.
Nate Silver's list of likely swing Senators is useful, but a bit too blunt. When trying to figure out whether a Senator will swing, you have to ask "on what?" Baucus might swing on taxes but not on abortion. McCain might swing on cap-and-trade but not on taxes. Lugar might cut deals on foreign policy but not on gay marriage. And so forth, and so on. "Swing" isn't actually a terribly useful descriptor. And if you're using the term in a more limited sense, to denote senators from states where they are vulnerable to political pressure, you have to figure out when their next election is. If Norm Coleman wins the recount, he's safe for six years. His actions in 2009 will have little bearing on his reelection in 2014. Blanche Lincoln, by contrast, is up for reelection in 2010, and her actions in 2009 will in part be a function of that upcoming challenge.Beyond individuals, though, you have to examine the environment. If Barack Obama is a popular president, than it would make little sense for Lincoln to swing against his priorities. If he's an unpopular president with a controversial agenda, the calculus reverses. So you have to distinguish senators who swing for their own reasons from senators who swing to secure reelection. Norm Coleman makes the occasional moderate vote because he doesn't want to lose his job, and so predicting his behavior requires assessing his electoral prospects. John McCain makes the occasional liberal vote because he wants to get on the teevee, so predicting his likely behavior requires assessing his personal interests. And then there's the question of party leadership. Sometimes a vulnerable senator might want to break with their president, but the leadership threatens consequences so severe that they swallow their terror and vote with their colleagues. But that requires strong and effective party leadership, and a belief that close association with the party will not be an electoral anchor. For the Republican Party, at this juncture, that calculus may or may not hold.All of this underscores what a complicated place the Senate is, and how important it is for a presidential administration to really understand the institution and its players. That's why I find the presence of Joe Biden, Rahm Emanuel, and Tom Daschle so reassuring. Before you can manipulate a senator's incentives, you have to understand, to a pretty high degree of abstraction, what those incentives are. The Clinton team, in 1993 and 1994, was clueless on this front. Obama's staff will not be.Image used under a CC license from .Bullish. 
