By Ezra
Daniel Levy has a great review of the book in Haaretz, and I think he gets it exactly right. The core of the Israel Lobby argument, the book's first half, is quite compelling. You really do need some way to account for Dick Armey's 2002 statement that "my number one priority in foreign policy is to protect Israel," and they open that discussion, and offer a very plausible hypothesis. Interest group capture is not rare or controversial. It accounts for a host of other policy decisions, from farm subsidies to the embargo on Cuba, and its existence here should be openly debated.
This section has shortcomings, to be sure. in particular, I agree with Levy's point that Walt and Mearsheimer give short shrift to cultural explanations, namely, a rippling Islamophobia which has made Israel more generally symbolic than it otherwise would be. "Pro-Israel sentiment is strengthened not by Israel's moral case," writes Levy, "but by an immoral negative stereotyping of Arabs and Muslims by many mainstream media outlets since 9/11. But Walt and Mearsheimer are less good at seeing America's warts, and totally overlook this trend."
The second half of the book is somewhat less compelling. They marshal much evidence to show that the Israel Lobby enthusiastically advocates for a belligerent American foreign policy. But they never prove that it's support is anything approaching causal for such undertakings as the Iraq War. As Levy puts it, "All of the examples are taken from the Bush era, post 9/11 and this brings us to the book's core weakness. Walt and Mearsheimer see too much continuity and not enough exceptionalism in this period." Agreed. In their rush to prove the Lobby's influence, they appear to suggest its dominance, which isn't likely. They do a useful service by clarifying the involvement of the Israel Lobby, and for that matter, Israeli politicians, in what should be domestic political decisions, but they mistake advocacy for causality. But like the rest of the book, it opens a discussion well worth having.
