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There is every reason to believe that short, victorious wars are enormously popular in Russia, in part because of Russian political history and culture, and in part because they're popular everywhere. There's also considerable reason to believe that, although the authoritarian elements in the Russian political system overstate Putin's strength, he remains a remarkably popular figure, unlikely to lose even in a free and fair election.
I think that Tim is quite right about this, but while internal democracy and the acceptance of international behavioral norms are connected (in that most countries that adopt one adopt the other) they aren't identical; some authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states accept territorial norms, while some democratic states reject them. Indeed, as Dan Drezner notes, Russia rejected such norms even when it was most democratic (1990s) and consistently pursued coercive influence in its near abroad.
With due respect, I think Tim is making two different arguments here; one valid, and one not. The less valid argument is that if Russia truly were a democracy (it's currently something between democratic and authoritarian by most measures of such things) then it would not be employing violence against Georgia. Tim:
Would Russia have pursued a military conflict there if they had a real opposition party in Parliament -- especially after their national experiences in Chechnya or Afghanistan -- or if Putin had lost the election? Would they have been able to surprise the world with their military deployment?Um... yes? As we've learned in the United States and the United Kingdom, the presences of an opposition party in parliament has no specific implications for how a country thinks about war. There's no guarantee that a Russian opposition party would stake out an anti-imperialist position; indeed, I'm strongly inclined to suspect that any viable opposition would compete with Putin over the promotion of just such a nationalistic message.
There is every reason to believe that short, victorious wars are enormously popular in Russia, in part because of Russian political history and culture, and in part because they're popular everywhere. There's also considerable reason to believe that, although the authoritarian elements in the Russian political system overstate Putin's strength, he remains a remarkably popular figure, unlikely to lose even in a free and fair election.
The more defensible:
If Russia had successfully incorporated itself into the international community in the last two decades, the underlying conflict would be there but perhaps it would have been pursued in non-violent ways. These aren't necessarily considerations in the immediate response to the crisis, but getting caught up in the short-term realpolitik of the situationThe point that Tim is getting at is that Russia has not accepted a set of international norms regarding the behavior of state's towards their neighbors. Indeed, the invasion of Georgia (including especially the direct attacks on Georgian territory) can be seen as a direct effort not simply to violate these norms, but indeed to destroy them; Russia believes that it should be able to do as it wants in its backyard, regardless of the disapproval of the West.
I think that Tim is quite right about this, but while internal democracy and the acceptance of international behavioral norms are connected (in that most countries that adopt one adopt the other) they aren't identical; some authoritarian or semi-authoritarian states accept territorial norms, while some democratic states reject them. Indeed, as Dan Drezner notes, Russia rejected such norms even when it was most democratic (1990s) and consistently pursued coercive influence in its near abroad.
--Robert Farley
