It's probably good news that Israel is contemplating releasing Palestinian Marwan Barghouti. But it's also an example of how strategically inchoate the Israeli government has become. Barghouti will be released for a simple reason: He's a Fatah leader with broad credibility, which means he stands some chance of rescuing the increasingly irrelevant political party, which lost considerable ground to Hamas in the aftermath of the bombing of Gaza. That was, you'll recall,the opposite of what was supposed to happen. Barghouti has had the peculiar political advantage of being jailed in an Israeli prison during Fatah's recent decline. In 2004, Israeli courts sentenced him to serve five life sentences plus 40 years. He was considered a dangerous extremist. Now, compared to the more dangerous extremists in Hamas, he's considered a potentially welcome alternative. One wonders how he feels about his jailers.Meanwhile, it's hard not to see this move strengthening Hamas. Reuters is reporting that "outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is trying to negotiate a last-minute deal with Hamas under which Israel would release 1,000 or more Palestinian prisoners in exchange for captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit." The high profile release of Barghouti would be done "to help Fatah." But few will be fooled: It was pressure from Hamas -- indeed, it was the combination of the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit and Israel's growing fear of strengthened Palestinian militancy -- that led to Barghouti's freedom. Over and again, With Hamas and with Fatah and with Barghouti, Israel tries to kill or imprison the credible Palestinian militants. And in the space left by the bombs and the absences, more hardline elements emerge, and soon enough, the dangerous extremists of yesteryear seem like the moderates who must be ushered back to the fore if a deal is to be done. It happened with Fatah, it's happening with Barghouti, and it will likely happen with Hamas before we're finished. If we're ever finished. TODAY'S ENEMY, TOMORROW'S FRIEND.
It's probably good news that Israel is contemplating releasing Palestinian Marwan Barghouti. But it's also an example of how strategically inchoate the Israeli government has become. Barghouti will be released for a simple reason: He's a Fatah leader with broad credibility, which means he stands some chance of rescuing the increasingly irrelevant political party, which lost considerable ground to Hamas in the aftermath of the bombing of Gaza. That was, you'll recall,the opposite of what was supposed to happen. Barghouti has had the peculiar political advantage of being jailed in an Israeli prison during Fatah's recent decline. In 2004, Israeli courts sentenced him to serve five life sentences plus 40 years. He was considered a dangerous extremist. Now, compared to the more dangerous extremists in Hamas, he's considered a potentially welcome alternative. One wonders how he feels about his jailers.Meanwhile, it's hard not to see this move strengthening Hamas. Reuters is reporting that "outgoing Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is trying to negotiate a last-minute deal with Hamas under which Israel would release 1,000 or more Palestinian prisoners in exchange for captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit." The high profile release of Barghouti would be done "to help Fatah." But few will be fooled: It was pressure from Hamas -- indeed, it was the combination of the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit and Israel's growing fear of strengthened Palestinian militancy -- that led to Barghouti's freedom. Over and again, With Hamas and with Fatah and with Barghouti, Israel tries to kill or imprison the credible Palestinian militants. And in the space left by the bombs and the absences, more hardline elements emerge, and soon enough, the dangerous extremists of yesteryear seem like the moderates who must be ushered back to the fore if a deal is to be done. It happened with Fatah, it's happening with Barghouti, and it will likely happen with Hamas before we're finished. If we're ever finished. 
