France had recently announced its first nuclear test, and the Sino-Soviet split made it clear that the Chinese would be acquiring nuclear technology. The world was getting worried about the possible spread of nuclear weapons.
And so, in 1961, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling on all member states to sign an accord that would prohibit the transfer from one state to another of nuclear weapons technology. By 1965, the Geneva disarmament conference pounded out language; by 1968, the language was settled and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as it came to be called, was open for signature; and in March 1970, it entered into force, with the United States and the then-Soviet Union among the original signatories.
As the above time line suggests, it took a while, but it was a process that, for the most part, worked very well for a very long time. Five nations had announced their nuclear capability in the 25 years between the time the United States became the first nuclear power in 1945 and the date that the treaty took effect (America, the Soviet Union, England, France, and China). In the 30 years after the treaty took effect, three more nations joined the club -- one per decade, on average.
And while we could argue that that's three too many, it's also extremely unlikely that any of these three countries would use their weapons for a first strike: India and Pakistan are trying to deter each other, and Israel (which has never confirmed having an arsenal) is seeking to make its various hostile neighbors think twice before doing anything rash.
So this process -- initiated and completed, of course, in that “useless” building that we should let drop into the East River -- helped maintain international order as long as its Big Five members, and especially the United States, backed it up. But now, for the first time ever, we have a government in the United States that does not play that role, and that makes its right-wing amen corner delirious with joy by talking tough about rogue regimes and refusing to negotiate with them.
And what's happened? One extremely dangerous nation, North Korea, has announced that it has nuclear weapons, and another extremely dangerous nation, Iran, is openly trying to get them. If Iran succeeds, that'd be two new nuclear powers in a few short years. And let's just say that, on the defensive vs. offensive use meter, these nations compare unfavorably to the three that joined the club during the NPT era.
Overly simplistic? A little. Obviously, we know that both nations have been trying to acquire nuclear weapons for years, long before the Bush administration took power. Iran's centrifuge program has been operating since the mid-1980s, thanks to help from Pakistan's A.Q. Khan; North Korea, which has native uranium mines and which trained scientists in the USSR during the Cold War, has pursued the technology for years as well.
But it's not that overly simplistic. It's a simple Newtonian equation: Tough-guy actions on one side mean that the other side will get tough, too. The American right loves to bash the 1994 Agreed Framework that the Clinton administration negotiated -- in direct talks -- with North Korea, and it seems clear that North Korea was violating it in crucial respects.
On the other hand, the framework accomplished some crucial goals, such as opening the country's only plutonium reprocessing plant to inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency. And more importantly, it wasn't until December 2002, after President Bush named North Korea as a member of the “axis of evil” and took steps that led to the suspension of heavy-oil shipments to North Korea -- a violation by America of the Agreed Framework, but one that you're less likely to read about in the American press -- that the North Koreans restarted their nuclear activities at its Yongbyon plant and kicked the IAEA inspectors out. The tat earned its tit.
With regard to Iran, the Bush administration has again banished the thought of any form of negotiation, and more than that, it has frowned on the only negotiations with Iran currently taking place, with Europe. Donald Rumsfeld went to Europe and talked nice last week at the Munich Security Conference, making the obligatory joke at his own expense about the “Old Europe/New Europe” remark he'd made at the same conclave two years prior. But on the question of the European negotiations with Iran, he offered nothing new: The United States would not endorse the initiative.
So: A nuclear North Korea, and an intractable Iran, hotly seeking nuclear weapons, both processes undoubtedly speeded up because of the administration's tough talk in this “unipolar moment.” The right wing and the U.S. media loved Bush's tough talk at the time. And they'll both keep falling for it. But history shows that while Bush-style Americans may be from Mars, it's the Venutians who do the tough work of negotiating that are actually making the world a safer place.
Michael Tomasky is the Prospect's executive editor.
