This is interesting:
NATO commanders in Afghanistan have decided to end local police training, fearing that cops in remote areas -- most of whom once fought for tribal warlords -- might one day turn their weapons against Kabul and the U.S.-led coalition.
The change in policy perhaps signals a shift in Western attitudes towards the growing ranks of sanctioned tribal armies that perform routine security functions in Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The “Sons of Iraq” militia groups, in particular, are a key facet of the U.S. strategy for preventing extremists from taking root in vulnerable Sunni communities.
But some military officers have questioned the long-term wisdom of arming sectarian groups whose allegiances are notoriously fickle.
Did the Pentagon hire Charles Tilly, or something? The skepticism about arming local groups with no allegiance to the central governments doesn't yet seem to have spread to Iraq, perhaps with good reason; the entire "Awakening" strategy which has accompanied the Surge is dependent on nothing so much as payoffs of money and weapons to the people who used to be killing American soldiers. Arming locals isn't part of the project in Iraq; the powers-that-be have determined that it is the project, consequences for the Iraqi state be damned.
--Robert Farley
