Press Association via AP Images
British Prime Minister Boris Johnson speaks during the opening session of the virtual global Leaders Summit on Climate, April 22, 2021.
Since January, the United States has pledged to reduce its emissions by 50 percent from 2005 levels by 2030, co-crafted an initiative to reduce global methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030, is phasing out hydrofluorocarbons, and has devised new transportation emissions standards, in tandem with a decisive push toward zero-emission vehicles. Biden also pledged $11 billion in the next two years to help developing nations cut emissions to meet their own climate targets and to assist the places at greatest risk for climate impacts—provided he can get Congress on board. (Developing nations’ earlier attempts to come up with financial goals were not fully realized either.) The world welcomed these measures as strong evidence that the U.S. has recommitted itself to international leadership.
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But with Congress holding up the legislative end of the bargain until the eve of COP26 (the United Nations’ Climate Change Conference, which will run from October 31 through November 12 in Glasgow), none of these moves will mean a thing until it’s clear what kind of leverage the president actually has. Biden’s “America is back” declarations won’t lift the veil of doubt that shrouds his country’s re-emergence on the global climate stage unless he can fly in with a sealed congressional deal. What matters are “credible pledges of ambition, backed by a solid reporting scheme,” says Joseph Majkut, director of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). “Other countries want to see how that’s going to happen.” That means they need to see the climate provisions in the Build Back Better bill now becalmed in Congress (or at least most of them) actually enacted.
Until then, Britain and the European Union are determined to push and prod the U.S. back into relevance. Despite its Brexit miscalculation, the COVID-19 pandemic, and a fuel crisis, Britain is determined to be a major player in Glasgow—courtesy of its special relationship with the United States. According to Mark Shanahan, an associate professor of politics at Britain’s University of Reading, Prime Minister Boris Johnson has aspirations of honest broker-dom and sees himself as the instrument prodding the U.S. to make good on its “America is back” positioning on climate change. He’s also keen on securing pledges from developed nations to phase out coal by 2030 and to serve as a conduit between the G20 and the emerging nations to fashion a workable consensus on climate goals.
Johnson may aspire to steer an American return to greatness, but his standing is as fraught on the international stage as it is at home. “There’s a sense here that he’s slightly disingenuous,” says Shanahan. “One of his Cabinet secretaries was supportive of a plan for a new U.K. coal mine recently, while the fanfares around COP26 are seen by many who don’t support the [Johnson] government as a distraction from the significant challenges this populist government faces going into a potential ‘winter of discontent’ at home.”
While Biden and Johnson may be aligned on issues like persuading developed countries to make good on climate financing pledges for developing nations, Shanahan sees Johnson actually fixated on a U.S.-U.K. free-trade deal, a factor that complicates his position at COP26. Having opted out of the European Union, Johnson needs to secure a compensatory trading relationship with the U.K.’s old “special relationship” Anglophone buddy.
“So while, to the outside world, COP26 is a unity of nations saving the planet, Boris Johnson’s real goal is saving his political skin by securing his coveted U.S. trade deal,” Shanahan says. “He may well have to sell his soul to Biden in support of POTUS’s climate goals to achieve that. If that’s the case, the U.S. president will need to get any agreement signed in blood in triplicate with as many witnesses as possible, since Johnson’s reputation for keeping his word is diminishing by the day.”
For their part, however, European Union leaders, who are likely pleased to be rid of the bombastic and mercurial Johnson, may end up sidelining him completely. Among the developed nations, the EU is probably the best positioned to serve as an example of what climate action looks like, one that the U.S. would do well to emulate. Unlike the U.S., the EU comes into COP26 with a set of agreed-upon EU-wide goals: a 55 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, twinned to a longer-term vision of a climate-neutral EU by 2050. The EU devised its own European Green Deal two years ago. The 27 members have locked horns on issues like coming up with specific time frames for increasing climate goals, but compared to America’s legislative impasse, the Europeans excel at the unappreciated art of compromise.
America likely can’t get back into the good graces of the world community until the president delivers demonstrable proofs that the U.S. intends to live up to any commitments made in Glasgow.
The administration joined forces with the EU prior to Glasgow, announcing a Global Methane Pledge that would reduce methane emissions by 30 percent by 2030. Methane is arguably is a greater short-term global-warming threat than carbon dioxide, having already contributed to half a degree of warming. Twenty-four countries have agreed to the initiative, which will be formally outlined at the climate conference. The presumptive signatories comprise nearly half of the 20 top methane-emitting countries.
Surveying the two great powers, the EU wants to see the U.S. increase and follow through on climate financial aid, and China commit to stronger emissions goals. Both the U.S. and the EU agree that China should come to the table with a stronger program of targets for reducing emissions. (For more on the U.S.-China climate conundrum, see my colleague Lee Harris’s analysis.) But the EU wants to stay out of America’s broader efforts to contain China and prefers to concentrate on areas of climate agreement, especially given the uncertainties around America’s climate stance and China relations posed by the 2022 midterm and the 2024 presidential elections.
A Pew Research Center September poll on climate of nearly 20,000 citizens in 17 developed countries in Europe, North America, and the Asia-Pacific found that both the EU and the United Nations are viewed more favorably on climate issues than the U.S. and China by majorities of the respondents. Nevertheless, 52 percent of respondents were “not too/not at all” confident that multilateral efforts would succeed in reducing the effects of climate change.
Biden’s assertiveness had only a limited impact on international opinion. A majority had low opinions of U.S. actions; 61 percent said that America is doing a “bad job” on climate. (Singapore was the sole country with a slightly positive view of U.S. policies.) Only China had a worse reputation: 75 percent of respondents rated China’s climate responses as bad; 45 percent as “very bad.”
As the Pew poll suggests, America likely can’t get back into the good graces of the world community until the president delivers demonstrable proofs that the U.S. intends to live up to any commitments made in Glasgow. No amount of presidential good cheer can erase the considerable international skepticism that Biden can deliver a consistent, lasting response to a global crisis amid the political fires burning hot at home.
The October 31 vote on the infrastructure and reconciliation bills in Congress draws a bright line under the president’s entire Glasgow portfolio. He can show up bearing the fruits of legislative victory or the supreme embarrassment of being cut off at the knees by reactionary forces on the opening of a global conference with life on the planet hanging in the balance. “The best thing that could be done to allay fears that the U.S. is an unreliable partner or that changing administrations will dramatically alter our approach to international climate negotiations is legislation,” says Majkut.
