When the first post- September 11 anthrax cases were revealed, speculation about who was responsible focused immediately on associates of Osama bin Laden or the government of Iraq. Now, though, it's widely believed that the anthrax attacks are homegrown, the result of an individual or a small domestic terrorist group. It also seems that the source of the anthrax is a U.S. government lab, since recent reports have said that the powder used in the attacks is virtually indistinguishable from anthrax produced by the military before it shut down its biowarfare program. In a strange way, all of this is good news. "The worst-case scenario is if there's a biological Unabomber out there who's making anthrax by himself," says Elisa Harris of the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland University, who previously has worked for the National Security Council. "That would suggest that the possibility of [using biological weapons] is much easier than previously thought."
Yet whoever turns out to be behind the current attacks, mostexperts say the risk of a major bioterrorist incident is clearly growing. Amongdomestic groups, right-wing extremists and messianic groups stand out as havingshown the greatest interest in carrying out such an attack. In 1997, FBI DirectorLouis Freeh specifically warned during testimony before Congress thatwhite-supremacist groups and militia organizations have sought to acquirebiological weapons. Jessica Stern, a former National Security Council staffer,has said that right-wing extremists are "obsessed" with biological agents andhave been trying to perfect their use for years.
Historically, the world has seen a few cases of bioterrorism, but until nownone has achieved much success. The only notable instance in the United Statescame in 1984, when members of the Rajneeshee cult in Oregon poisoned salad barswith salmonella, which sickened 751 people. But W. Seth Carus, a bioweaponsexpert at the National Defense University until being hired at the new Office ofHomeland Security (OHS), says that there has been "an explosion of interest" inbioterrorism in recent years.
American right-wingers have considered and sometimes planned theuse of biological weapons since at least 1972, when a white-supremacist groupcalled the Order of the Rising Sun apparently created as much as 40 kilograms oftyphoid bacteria cultures in a college laboratory. They planned to contaminatewater supplies in Chicago, St. Louis, and other midwestern cities, therebyleading to the deaths of "inferior" populations. The plot was uncovered when twomembers of the group panicked and informed police. At about the same time, theMinutemen, a right-wing outfit headed by the owner of a Missouri veterinary drugfirm doing business as Biolab Corporation threatened to disperse a biologicalvirus at airline terminals. More recently, in October 2001, a violentanti-abortion group calling itself the Army of God sent threatening letterscontaining bogus anthrax to Planned Parenthood headquarters in Washington, D.C.,and to branches elsewhere in the United States.
Biological agents are effective in small amounts and arerelatively cheap and easy to produce. A 1999 Defense Department study found thata domestic team with biological training was able to produce two pounds of mockaerosolized anthrax for about $1.6 million. The team had little trouble ingathering fermenters, grinders, and other necessary laboratory equipment. TimothyTobiason, a right-wing agricultural-chemical entrepreneur from Nebraska,currently sells copies of a germ-warfare cookbook he authored that experts say isaccurate enough to be dangerous.
Perhaps the easiest biological agent to produce is ricin, which the Bulgariansecret police used during the Cold War era to assassinate dissident GeorgiMarkov. (He was jabbed with an infected umbrella tip while waiting for a bus inLondon.) In 1995, Douglas Baker and Leroy Wheeler of the so-called MinnesotaPatriots Council produced ricin toxin from a castor-bean-based recipe and plannedto use it to assassinate government officials. Fortunately, the FBI hadpenetrated the group, and Baker and Wheeler became the first people convictedunder the Biological Weapons and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989.
Terrorists might also try to steal a "seed culture" from a biological-warfareresearch lab or university research center. Until recently, supply houses sold arange of virus and bacteria strains to medical researchers. A 1995 report fromthe Canadian Security Intelligence Service noted the case of one supplier thatwas promoting the sale of five toxins for the price of four. In 1998, Larry WayneHarris, an activist with ties to the Christian Identity movement and AryanNation, bought three vials of the bacterium that causes plague from the American Type Culture Collection in Rockville, Maryland--the same company that soldanthrax to Iraq in the 1980s. Harris, who was arrested after he talked openly ofemploying biological weapons and made threatening remarks to U.S. officials,successfully ordered the bacterium on stationery from a fake laboratory.
Rules on the sale of viruses and bacteria were tightened after Harris's arrestand again following the new anthrax cases, but they are not airtight. TheRajneeshees obtained their salmonella agent from a medical supply house and couldpotentially still do so today since that agent is not on the control list.
Of course, delivering a biological weapon is far more complicatedthan producing or obtaining a toxin. The Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo had amplefinancial and technical resources, including a Ph.D. microbiologist, but failedin more than a dozen attempts to spread biological agents such as anthrax andbotulinum toxin. (The Aum had better success with chemical weapons. In 1995, itreleased the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway, killing 12 persons andinjuring thousands.)
Still, Carus of the OHS warns that the technologicalsophistication of terrorist groups is growing and that there are countlesspotential delivery systems. The most likely means would be aerosolization--whichwould make a domed stadium a perfect target--but a biological agent could also beused to contaminate prepackaged food or water supplies. A less discussed thoughfar simpler means of biological terrorism would be to target livestock (forexample, with African swine fever) or grain (with pathogens such as rice blast orwheat stem rust). That wouldn't produce human casualties, but it would have anenormous economic impact and is far easier to do than creating a biologicalweapon for use against humans.
As the current anthrax investigation continues, most analysts expect to see anew upsurge in bioterrorism. In the past, terrorist groups feared that committingmass murder would delegitimize their cause. That appears to be less the casetoday; and American extremist groups, such as neo-Nazi outfits, typically don'tcare much about public opinion.
But the main reason for the fear of new attacks is all the attention focusedon biological terrorism in the wake of the anthrax scare. The notoriety gained bythe Aum and the well-publicized arrest of Larry Wayne Harris both prompted aspike in bioterror incidents, and the copycat effect is likely to be especiallygreat today given the "success" of the person or group behind the recent anthraxattacks. "I am absolutely convinced that [this] will spawn more incidents," saysCheryl Loeb of the Monterey Institute of International Studies. "The longer theperpetrators go free the more likely it will be to inspire more attacks, aspeople see they can get away with it."
