"If something is defined as real, it is real," goes a common dictum of thesocial sciences. The passive voice, however, conceals an uncertainty: Defined bywhom? What if, for example, two antagonists define their conflict in opposing ways?
As American forces strike in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden and theTaliban say this is a religious war--a view that reportedly has resonance throughmuch, though not all, of the Islamic world. If not merely our adversaries butmillions of others define the war as religious, is that the reality?
No, we say, we have no conflict with Islam. Muslims in America live in peaceand enjoy the right to practice their religion more freely than in many officiallyIslamic countries. In Kosovo we intervened on behalf of a Muslim people. If thereis prejudice in America against Arabs and Muslims, it violates our deepestprinciples and we mean to combat it.
We frame the war in different ways. At the most general level, we say this isthe War on Terrorism, a war against clandestine enemies that threatencivilization everywhere and against the states and shadowy transnationalorganizations that sponsor and support them. If the terrorists hijack Islam, thenit too is a victim of their perfidy.
At the same time, we define the war in highly personal terms. It is a war,unlike any other in our history, against a single man, Osama bin Laden, and hisimmediate lieutenants. The focus on an identifiable person carries the implicitmeaning that this is only a limited conflict, not a "clash of civilizations." Justgive up bin Laden and his henchmen, President Bush told the Taliban beforefighting began, though as time goes on, the idea of limiting the objectives ofthe war to bin Laden's killing or capture seems increasingly implausible. Thefocus on bin Laden may have inadvertently given his message more prominence, butit has the positive function of suggesting that one day, with bin Laden's death,we can declare the war over.
Still, we won't get off so easily from the war of definitions. Since theTaliban regime observes no distinction between church and state, we are fighting aleadership that is as much religious as political. The aftermath of September 11has also made us aware that in many Islamic countries schools run underfundamentalist auspices have been spreading anti-American hatred and incubatingthe terrorist networks now threatening our security. And rather than simply beingan expression of indigenous sentiment, these schools have developed with moneyfrom Saudi Arabia--officially our ally, though silent and uncooperative in thecurrent struggle.
At home, we expect our government not to favor one religion over another orenter into the internal disputes within a religion on behalf of any sect ordenomination. Some cases do test our principles: religious beliefs or practices,for example, that interfere with the performance of legal obligations. But on thewhole, the state is able to maintain its neutrality because the instances ofreligious conflicts with the legal order or national security are relativelymarginal.
The issue is different when we look abroad today and considerthe ramifications for our foreign policy. Americans have a stake in the outcome ofconflicts within Islam; we cannot pretend to be neutral about sectarian movementsand institutions that not only justify violence against us but also channel youngmen into the networks that carry it out. In this sense, the war has a religiouscharacter: It pits us against a religious tendency. The point, however, is notconfined to Islam. Jewish extremists in Israel, unwilling to enter any kind ofcompromise with Palestinians, also present a threat to peace, not because theythreaten us with violence, but because they promise to block agreements thatwould benefit our security as well as Israel's.
In short, the neutrality toward religious differences that ourgovernment observes at home is not sustainable in foreign policy--at least, notto the degree that it is domestically. Contests for influence that wouldordinarily be none of the state's business inside our borders are necessarily itsbusiness abroad. The problem is doubly complicated in the Saudi and Israeli casesbecause of our uneasy alliances with the governments and the difficult internalsituations each of them faces. We are scarcely able to breathe a word ofcriticism, much less exert any pressure.
Unlike Europe and so much of the rest of the world, America has avoided warsof religion. This is one of many reasons why the current struggle is deeplythreatening to us. It may pull us into a kind of conflict that appears to violateprinciples that are fundamental to our constitutional system and nationalachievement. The challenge for us is to recognize the religious realities of thewar without allowing the conflict to become a war of religion. Only if we win thewar about the war can we hope, in the long run, to win the war itself.
