Ariel Schalit/Associated Press
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addresses his supporters at party headquarters after elections in Tel Aviv, Israel, Wednesday, September 18, 2019.
It’s not clear at all what happens next, except that Netanyahu is much further from his heart’s desire—immunity from prosecution. A third election is possible. In a moment, I’ll explain why, and explain what to look out for as this strange game continues.
But first, a reminder of how we got here: Israel held early elections in April. Netanyahu’s main goal was to put together a right-wing coalition that would pass two laws: the first giving him immunity, and the second to keep the Supreme Court from overturning the first. Initially, it looked like he’d won: His own Likud Party plus its usual allies—right-wing and clerical parties—won 65 out of 120 seats in parliament.
Then, to the surprise of the prime minister and every other Israeli, coalition talks collapsed. Avigdor Lieberman, leader of the secular, hard-right Israel Is Our Home Party, rejected demands of an ultra-Orthodox party.
Netanyahu then decided to gamble on a remake election.
The campaign for this one was soporific, except for Netanyahu’s ever more strident racism. He attempted, and failed, to pass a law supposedly aimed against election fraud and actually intended to suppress the vote among Israel’s large Arab minority. He proclaimed that a vote for ex-general Benny Gantz, the center-right leader of the largest opposition party, was really a vote for Ahmed Tibi, the best-known face of the Joint List, the alliance of four parties representing the Arab community. He outdid that claim by labeling Lieberman an ally of the Joint List.
It didn’t work.
In Tuesday’s election, the Likud dropped from 35 seats in parliament to 31. The actual loss is considerably larger, though. Following the April election, the Likud had merged with Kulanu, a minor right-wing party with four seats. Next, Netanyahu signed a deal with libertarian ultra-nationalist Moshe Feiglin, whose party got three seats’ worth of votes in April’s vote, but did not reach 3.25 percent of the national popular vote, the threshold to enter parliament. Netanyahu promised Feiglin a cabinet seat and to open the medical cannabis market to imports (yes, really) in return for dropping out. On paper, therefore, the Likud entered the new election with a possible strength of between 39 and 42 seats. It lost 8 to 11 of them.
Some of those votes went to his usual allies, so the overall drop for parties supporting Netanyahu went from 60 seats to 55. Three seats went to Lieberman’s party. Those are the votes of rightists who rejected Netanyahu and his concessions to clerical parties.
Meanwhile, turnout among the Arab minority jumped from 50 percent to 60 percent. The Joint List won 13 seats, compared to the 10 its constituent parties won in April. Netanyahu forgot that in politics, the most potent force is backlash: Rather than suppress the Arab vote, he helped to energize it.
One more detail defying conventional wisdom: It’s usually assumed that young Israelis lean to the right, and that younger people are more likely to vote for niche parties. The largest pool of young votes is the military, whose votes are counted a day later than the rest. This time, the soldiers’ votes added a seat to Blue and White, contributing to its status as the largest party in the new parliament (with 33 seats). Yes, Blue and White is right of center, but much—perhaps most—of its support came from people voting strategically to get rid of Netanyahu.
Yet the result, for now, is deadlock. A fragmented public and parliament stand in the way of creating a government.
Here’s why: All politics in Israel involves coalitions. In two-party systems, the parties are coalitions themselves, put together before the election. In multi-party systems like Israel’s, coalitions are normally created after the election. Ideally, this creates flexibility, along with representation for small groups.
Over time, though, Israeli parties have formed into two blocs. On the right, which is much the more cohesive, has been an alliance of the Likud, smaller right-wing parties, and ultra-Orthodox parties.
Lieberman’s rebellion cracked the right-wing bloc. He insists that his price for joining a government includes long-overdue secularist measures such as instituting civil marriage and requiring ultra-Orthodox schools to teach a core curriculum of general studies. More specifically, he demands a government composed of his party, Blue and White, and the Likud. Blue and White loves that idea—so long as Gantz is prime minister and Netanyahu is a private citizen, soon to be defendant.
The rival bloc never coalesced in the same way. It included centrist and left-wing parties drawing mainly on the country’s Jewish majority, as well as parties backed by the Arab minority. The only prime minister willing to break the all-too-explicit and ugly political taboo on alliances with the Arab parties was Yitzhak Rabin. (After Rabin’s assassination, Shimon Peres briefly maintained the alliance.) There are ideological reasons on both sides for this divide—but the right’s racist success at delegitimizing the Arab parties is the strongest factor.
On paper, Gantz could form a coalition based on a majority of 65 members of parliament, if it included Lieberman’s party and the Arab parties’ Joint List. Even were Gantz willing to consider this, large parts of his party are not, and Lieberman certainly isn’t.
To get a parliamentary majority, then, Gantz needs the Likud. To fulfill his promises, he needs the Likud without Netanyahu.
In theory, Gantz could make a deal with the Joint List in which it gave a vote of confidence in him as prime minister without joining his government. It’s more than unlikely. Then again, Gantz did call Joint List leader Ayman Odeh after the polls closed Tuesday. Apparently, his more limited goal was getting support in the initial consultations with President Ruvi Rivlin on who should be prime minister. It’s possible, though, that Netanyahu’s reckless rhetoric has had another boomerang effect—making the boycott of the Arab parties appear to be just one more bit of Netanyahuism that decent people must avoid. If so, the taboo against the Arab parties supporting or participating in a government may be weakening.
Predictions would be absurd. After the April election, no one predicted another one in September. But here are some things to look out for:
First, Likud infighting. If the deadlock continues, will Likud politicians maintain their abject loyalty to Netanyahu? Dumping him, and opening the succession race, is a quick ticket to sharing power with Gantz. But Netanyahu has long since managed to push most people with backbones and principles out of the party.
Second, the legal process. On October 2, less than two weeks from now, Netanyahu’s defense attorneys have a meeting with prosecutors in which they will make arguments against indicting him. (This is a standard part of the legal process.) If—a very big if—Attorney General Avichai Mandelblit decides to indict before a government is formed, the entire process will become even more chaotic.
Third, the deadlock could persist, and yet another election could be called for early next year. Logically, the Likud should fear this. No one in Israeli politics should want to risk it. But logic has gone on sabbatical this year.
Lastly, there are the two parties of the Israeli left. In the current drama, they are bit players. In this election, Labor got a mere six seats. The Democratic Camp, formerly Meretz, got five. In part, they failed to stand out as alternatives. Running against Netanyahu’s corrupt, authoritarian ways wasn’t enough. Blue and White did that too. Offering insistent secularism, the old culture-war mainstay of the Israeli left, was certainly insufficient. Even Avigdor Lieberman offered that.
To rebuild, the left has to act, well, like the left: It needs to challenge the old racist taboos. It has to talk about ending the occupation as an Israeli interest. It has to connect to the people who have suffered from the Likud’s economics while they voted for the Likud’s platform of fear. Distaste with Netanyahu isn’t enough—especially if he is finally gone.
