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Pundits are fixated on the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025, but Russell Vought, the man described as Trump’s chief of staff-in-waiting, recently published an overlooked, dangerous plan that would place control of federal spending in Trump’s hands. It turns on the issue of impoundment, an outlawed practice that involves a president withholding funds appropriated by Congress. The first Trump administration attempted to use impoundment to further its agenda, and a second will not be deterred.
Here’s how impoundment in the hands of President Trump could work.
Example one: The 2021 bipartisan infrastructure law contained $326 billion for transportation, including $40 billion for bridges and $8 billion for freight and highway transportation projects. Not all that money has been spent, however, and in some cases, the agencies responsible for spending the funds have not yet finalized contracts to commit those funds to a particular project. Trump could decide he doesn’t like states getting that money if they contain so-called “sanctuary cities,” because they constitute a security threat. He could subsequently order his executive branch to withhold funds from being spent in those states until they change their laws.
Example two: Public schools serve about 50 million kids and cost about $860 billion, with 10.5 percent of those funds coming from the federal government, or about $90 billion. The Trump administration could withhold funds from schools with DEI programs, or school libraries that carry books blacklisted by the administration, perhaps on the basis that they somehow embody foreign propaganda.
Example three: In 2024, Congress appropriated $95 billion in emergency aid to Ukraine, Taiwan, and Israel, with $60.8 billion for Ukraine in particular. President Trump could decide he doesn’t support Ukraine, and withhold the funds. In fact, such an action—where Trump withheld funds from Ukraine in an attempt to pressure that country to investigate Joe Biden—was the basis for his first impeachment.
Who was on point for Trump at the time? It was his head of the Office of Management and Budget, Russ Vought, a self-described “radical constitutionalist” who was described as pushing a “‘post-Constitutional’ vision” for the second term” by The Washington Post.
Vought serves as president of the Center for Renewing America, “a far-right group operating under the aegis of the Conservative Partnership Institute,” in the words of The New Yorker. The Center is the Trump administration in exile, and the Conservative Partnership Institute is the brainchild of the far-right effort to take control of the government. To give you a taste, Jeffrey Clark, the Justice Department official Trump wished to make attorney general as part of his coup, and who was indicted for trying to overturn Georgia’s 2020 election results, serves as the Center’s senior fellow and director of litigation.
The issue of control over federal spending is long settled in Congress’s favor.
And it is the Center for Renewing America that released an op-ed and white paper arguing the president can disregard prohibitions on impoundment and unilaterally decide which funds will be spent. Reading their arguments is like looking into a fun-house mirror. They argue, in essence, that the president has inherent power by virtue of his office to make decisions to impound funds, and how dare Congress protect its authority pursuant to a 50-year-old law passed by both chambers and signed by the president.
This is scary enough, but it appears that cooler heads in Congress will not prevail. Last week, House Appropriations Committee Chair Tom Cole made a surprising statement: A future President Trump would have the right to use impoundment to override spending decisions enacted by Congress. In other words, the person most responsible for setting spending levels in the House of Representatives right now, who could also be in that position next year, said the president could simply decide to not spend funds as Congress directs.
The issue of control over federal spending is long settled in Congress’s favor. In the wake of scandalous efforts by the Nixon administration to withhold funds appropriated in legislation, Congress enacted the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 that removed any existing presidential impoundment power and required congressional assent to rescind specific government spending. In short: Congress writes the legislation that decides how funds are spent.
The administration cannot get two bites at the funding apples. Once the president signs a bill into law (or it is passed over his veto), he cannot turn around and refuse to spend the funds.
Under the Impoundment Control Act, the White House can withhold funds for 45 legislative session days, at which point Congress must either pass legislation to rescind the funds or the money must be released. In other words, Congress still ultimately gets to make the call. The Supreme Court blessed this view in 1975, in Train v. New York, holding that the White House cannot use its authority to shortchange funding directed by Congress. After all, Congress holds the power of the purse, and the president’s job is to faithfully execute the laws, not rewrite them.
The Trump administration made several runs at using impoundment to further its policy agenda, mostly notably in 2019 when it withheld funds approved for Ukraine for 55 days. This was done to pressure Ukraine to open an investigation into Joe Biden to aid Trump’s re-election effort. These allegations formed the basis for Trump’s first impeachment in December 2019.
The Government Accountability Office, a legislative branch agency responsible for overseeing aspects of the Impoundment Control Act, questioned the White House’s conduct, and ultimately issued a legal opinion in January 2020 holding that the administration had violated the law. “Faithful execution of the law does not permit the President to substitute his own policy priorities for those that Congress has enacted into law,” the GAO wrote. “In fact, Congress was concerned about exactly these types of withholdings when it enacted and later amended the ICA.”
This was contrary to the view expressed by Trump’s director of the Office of Management and Budget—Vought—who is now pumping out publications in support of presidential impoundment powers, including attacks on the GAO. The arguments articulate the law as reflected by a fun-house mirror.
Yes, it’s true that presidents have exercised impoundment powers since the founding, but that authority was largely cut off when the Impoundment Control Act was enacted in 1974.
Yes, it’s true that there are some circumstances where impoundment makes sense, such as that the funds can be spent more efficiently, but the Impoundment Control Act addresses those circumstances.
Yes, presidents have long sought to use impoundment in the form of a congressionally enacted line-item veto, but the Supreme Court held in Clinton v. City of New York that a law delegating that authority is unconstitutional. As the Court said in 1998, “There is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes.” That is Congress’s job. Any work-arounds require Congress to be the decision-maker.
So how would renewed presidential impoundment powers play out?
If we assume Republicans control the House, Senate, and White House, things would be bad indeed. The only limits on Trump would be (1) the filibuster and (2) Republican appropriators who take an institutionalist view. The filibuster would not necessarily stand as an impediment, as it could be eliminated or circumvented. And Rep. Cole, who traditionally has been a Republican institutionalist, has signaled he would be just fine with impoundment.
The courts could continue to enforce the Impoundment Control Act, but the Roberts Court has shown it is willing to throw away long-standing precedent, from Roe (abortion) to Heller (guns) to Chevron (agency deference). It also has no problem unbalancing the separation of powers and articulating a very imperial view of the presidency, as we saw with the recent immunity decision.
If we assume that Democrats control at least one chamber, the assertion of impoundment powers by the president seriously disrupts the ability of the parties to negotiate. What agreement could they reach when the White House can simply disregard any spending decision by withholding funds? He would be able to dictate terms. The only limit on the White House would be that the president could not spend funds in excess of those that Congress has appropriated. An effort to spend money not authorized by appropriations led to the Iran-Contra scandal.
The Trump administration-in-exile has shown its authoritarian hand. The Supreme Court has shown its authoritarian hand. Even an institutionalist like Rep. Tom Cole is feeling the pull to elevate presidential powers far beyond what a constitutional republic can bear.
Impoundment when used by any president fundamentally undermines the Founders’ design of Congress making the spending decisions. We are in an era where presidents already are too powerful, and impoundment tips the scales further toward an imperial presidency not constrained by Congress, the courts, or the American people.
